IN PROGRESS

I have been doing some experimental and behavioral economics works on the following topics. Papers will be available for download soon.

Delegation of Formal and Real Authority in the Lab (joint work with Zhang Jianlin):

This work aims to test experimentally the theoretical predictions of Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) seminal paper on the delegation of formal and real authority in organizations. We recruited about 150 undergraduate students for this project. We have completed the experiments and are currently processing the data.

Enforcement of Social Norms, Third Party Punishment Game with Multiple Third Party Observers (joint work with Zhang Jianlin):

This work aims to extend the analysis of Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) on the enforcement of social norms using third party punishment. By using a modified version of the Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) dictator game, we vary the size of the third party observers and the cost of punishment, and also introduce the direct impact of punishment on the recipient. We recruited about 300 undergraduate students for this project. The experiments have already been completed and we are currently processing the data.

Comparing Seed Grant and Challenge Grant in Charitable Giving (joint work with Cheryl Chan):

Seed grants and challenge grants are commonly employed in many fundraising drives done by charitable organizations. With a seed grant, the charity secures a large donation from an initial donor prior to soliciting donations from other potential donors. A challenge grant is a pledge by a donor to provide a lump-sum top up to the amount donated by other donors provided that a certain target amount of donations is met. Essentially, in the former scheme, the initial seed money is already on the table (unconditional commitment), while in the latter scheme, the money is only committed if the amount raised reaches a certain milestone (conditional commitment). We are interested in evaluating the charitable behaviour of donors when facing these fundraising schemes. We have conducted several experimental sessions on this subject involving around 100 undergraduate students. We are currently processing the data.

Gift Exchange in Charitable Giving (joint work with Cheryl Chan):

It is very common to see charities hand a gift to donors as a token of appreciation for their donations. In this project, we investigate the impact of receiving gifts on the charitable behaviour of donors. We vary the monetary value of the gift ranging from an inexpensive gift that costs around $1 per item to an expensive one that costs around $14 per item. In addition, we also vary the functionality of the gift. Falk (2007) shows that donors tend to reciprocate the kind act shown by charities by donating more money to charities. He shows that the amount donated increases with the quantity of the gifts; however, he does not significantly vary the monetary value and functionality of the gifts. We have conducted several experimental sessions on this subject involving around 150 undergraduate students. We are currently processing the data.

Category Reporting in Charitable Giving: An Experimental Analysis (joint work with Jingping Li):

Harbaugh (1998a) theoretically shows that charities can increase donations by acknowledging donors using categories. In a complementary paper, using data on donations given by 146 lawyers to their alma mater law school, Harbaugh (1998b) provides an empirical support to his theoretical assertion. Essentially, being acknowledged in categories give donors some prestige benefits. In this paper we present a lab experimental evidence on the impact of category reporting plan on donors' behavior. Our result shows that, although the category reporting plan has an insignificant impact on the amount of donations when compared to the exact reporting plan and the no reporting plan, it does significantly alter donors' charitable behavior. We show that the presence of category reporting plan induces clustering of donations around the categories.

 

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(c)2007 Yohanes E. Riyanto.
Version 1.0 Dec 2007